Introduction 1
Central to the works of Hans Kelsen, H. L. A. Hart, and many other legal theorists of the past century 1 is the idea that law is a normative system, and that any theory about the nature of law must focus on its normativity. There are familiar questions connected with explaining legal normativity: e.g., What is the connection between legal normativity and other normative systems, in particular, morality? And there are methodological questions: when theorists claim that we need to (and that they will) "explain the normativity of law," what is it that is being explained? This article will focus on issues relating to legal normativity, emphasizing the way these matters have been elaborated in the works of Kelsen and Hart and later commentators on their theories.
2
In section 2, I will offer a view regarding the nature of the law and legal normativisty focusing on Kelsen's work (at least one reasonable reading of it 2 ). The argument will be that the Basic Norm 3 is presupposed when a citizen chooses to read the actions of legal officials in a normative way. In this Kelsenian approach, all normative systems are structurally and logically similar, but each normative system is independent of every other system -thus, law is, in this sense, conceptually separate from morality.
3 Section 3 will turn to Hart's theory, analyzing the extent to which his approach views legal normativity as sui generis. This approach will raise questions regarding what has become a consensus view in contemporary jurisprudence: that law makes moral claims. I will show how a more deflationary (and less morally-flavored) understanding of the nature of law is tenable, and may in fact work better than current conventional (morality-focused) understandings.
normative system of a particular religion or a particular moral system. However, it is important to note: this does not exclude lawmakers in fact being influenced by the content of another normative system -e.g., morality or religion. One must distinguish the logical structure of (all) normative systems from the empirical/historical/causal claims regarding why certain lawmakers promulgated the legal norms they did.
Presupposing the Basic Norm 8
In Kelsen's works, one can find language to the effect that the presupposition of the Basic Norm is required to make "possible the interpretation of the subjective sense of [certain material facts] as their objective sense, that is, as objectively valid norms ...". 12 At the same time, Kelsen makes it clear, in a number of places, that one need not presuppose the Basic Norm. 13 In particular, Kelsen notes that the anarchist need not, and would not, see the actions of legal officials as anything other than "naked power", 14 with the legal system being for them nothing more than the "gunman situation writ large". Similarly, Kelsen writes: "For the Pure Theory strongly emphasises that the statement that the subjective meaning of the law-creating act is also its objective meaning -the statement, that is, that law has objective validity -is only a possible interpretation of that act, not a necessary one". 16 Kelsen adds: "The Pure Theory aims simply to raise to the level of consciousness what all jurists are doing (for the most part unwittingly) when, in conceptualizing their object of enquiry, they ... understand the positive law as a valid system, that is, as a norm, and not merely as factual contingencies of motivation".
17
10 Thus, Kelsen speaks about those who see legal actions as norms, in some places noting, in other places simply implying, that one can also choose 18 not to see such actions in a normative way. This point can be generalized across normative systems. Some look at events in our (natural, empirical world) and see norms: obligations (reasons) to act according to the requirements of etiquette, the dictates of a religious system, or the norms of a legal system. Other equally competent and intelligent adults can look at the same world and see nothing normative: etiquette systems may seem like the trivial rules of a pointless game; religious norms may seem like the superstitions of the ignorant and the self-deluded; and legal rules may seem like just one more way by which the powerful control and oppress the less powerful. And, of course, some people may see in a normative way in some of these areas but not in others.
11 This reading of Kelsen and normativity is related to Joseph Raz's helpful idea of "detached normative statements". Raz's basic idea is that one can speak of what a normative rule or system requires, without necessarily endorsing or accepting that rule or system. 19 Thus, someone who is not a vegetarian can say to a vegetarian friend, "you should not eat that (because it has meat in its ingredients)", and a non-believer can say to an Orthodox Jewish friend, "you should not accept that speaking engagement (because it would require you to work on your Sabbath)". Analogously, the radical lawyer or anarchist scholar can make claims about what one ought to do if one accepted the legal system (viewed the actions of legal officials in a normative way), even if that lawyer or scholar saw the actions of legal officials only in a non-normative way, as mere acts of power.
12 Another way to get at the general point is John Gardner's observation that law is voluntary in a way that morality is not. Gardner argues that morality's claim upon all of us, as human beings, is "inescapable". 20 According to Gardner, one cannot reasonably ask 13 However, it may be that the reference to "inescapability" is too vague to be useful here. One might argue that the sanctions pervasively and importantly present in all (or almost all) legal systems (past and present) 23 make law, in a sense, "inescapable". 24 One might choose not to see the actions of legal officials as creating valid norms, but law (at least in systems that are efficacious) is not something that a practically reasonable person could ignore, the way that she could ignore (say) fashion, etiquette, or chess. Still, while one may be unable to "escape" or ignore the coercive power of the State, one can choose not to think of the State's actions in a normative way.
14 I am not sure that the Kelsenian approach (as I am interpreting it) would go even as far as declaring morality (unlike law) to be "inescapable", for morality (or one's moral system) would be, under this analysis, just one more normative system that one could choose or not choose, assert or not assert. Certainly, we see around us a wide variety of (secular and religion-based) moral systems being advocated or assumed -with a broad range of variations on consequentialism, deontological ethics, and virtue ethics (and mix-andmatch combinations of the three), just among the secular approaches to morality.
15 The general view of normativity underlying the present analysis is often explained in analogy to games. For example, one might say to people playing chess that they ought not (e.g.) to move the bishop a certain way. However, those same people could decide never to play chess, in which case these sort of prescriptions about how one ought to move the bishop would have no application. 25 (Of course, one might make an all-things-considered judgment as to whether it is right to play chess on a particular occasion, or whether it is wise to devote significant time to chess as a hobby, but these are very different inquiries, and, in any event, few would argue that everyone has an unconditional (moral?) obligation either to play chess or to avoid playing chess.) 16 The voluntariness of affiliation with religions is somewhat more complicated. On one hand, in many societies today the normative rules of a particular religion are not thought to be binding on those who are not members of that religious group. Of course, the way we think about religion today is far different from the way people thought about it in the past. As Jacques Barzun points out, "in earlier times people rarely thought of themselves as 'having' or belonging to' a religion. ... Everybody 'had' a soul, but did not 'have a God', for God and all that pertained to Him was simply what is, just as today nobody has 'a physics'; there is only one and it is automatically taken to be the transcript of reality".
26
And similarly, true believers even today (especially in countries in which fundamentalist views have greater social and political influence) see the dictates of their religion as simply the Truth, binding on all.
17 Back to law: if one views legal rules and official actions as things that people may or may not view in a normative way, this understandably affects how one views Kelsen's Basic Norm -the role it plays and how it is justified. As Paulson has pointed out, 27 it is common now to view Kelsen's argument for the Basic Norm as a neo-Kantian version of the Kantian transcendental deduction. A transcendental argument (to simplify) goes from a conclusion of what must be true, lest the ultimate conclusion be false, or, at any rate, unsupported. Kant's transcendental deduction (again, to simplify) went from the unity of our experience to the requirement of categories of thought (e.g., time, space, substance, and causation) projected onto sense data. 28 For Kelsen, the relevant transcendental deduction is something along the following lines: since law is (experienced as) normative, Kelsen, Hart, and legal normativity Revus, 34 | 2018 the Basic Norm must be presupposed. The difficulty, as Paulson has pointed out, 29 is that Transcendental Arguments depend on there being only one available explanation for the matter being examined (in Kant's case, the unity of experience; in Kelsen's case, the normativity of law), and that Kelsen did not come close to proving that his approach was the only available explanation.
30
18 However, the approach discussed in this article does not require the full machinery of a Kantian Transcendental Deduction; it requires only belief in the basic and generally accepted Humean division of "is" and "ought," combined with a comparably conventional idea that law is a normative system. Where one asserts the validity of any lower-level norm in a legal system, 31 one implicitly asserts or presupposes the validity of the foundational norm of the system.
Concerns 19
In an earlier work, 32 Paulson expressed concerns about the sort of reading of Kelsen's work I am offering here. 33 His primary worry was that this reading leaves the Basic Norm in particular, and Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law in general, doing little work, and not the important task that Kelsen seemed to set for himself. Kelsen's Pure Theory offers the Basic Norm (and its presupposition) as the key to explaining the objective meaning of norms generally, not just for those who happen to choose to interpret official actions in a normative way.
20 I disagree that the proffered reading of Kelsen leaves Kelsen's theory unimportant, and the reading has the distinct benefit of being more defensible than more ambitious readings of Kelsen's aims. 34 Kelsen's Pure Theory, as I read it, offers important insights about the logic of norms, about what follows from the fact that someone reads the actions of officials normatively, and it offers related insights regarding the connections (or lack thereof) between law and morality, and regarding whether (or not) one has an obligation to accept or presuppose the Basic Norm of one's legal system.
H. L. A. Hart and the relationship of law and morality
3.1 Hart and the internal point of view 21 H. L. A. Hart, like Kelsen, emphasized the normativity of law in his criticism of earlier legal theorists (particularly that of John Austin), and in the development of his own, more hermeneutic theory of law. Hart argued that Austin's command theory did not sufficiently distinguish a community acting out of fear, the "gunman situation writ large". 35 from a community where the officials and at least some portion of the citizens treated the law as giving them reasons for action -what Hart called "the internal point of view". 22 As part of the legal positivist separation of law and morality that he advocated, (a) Hart is careful not to claim that citizens must accept the law as giving them reasons for action (he does not even discuss the circumstances under which citizens should do so); and (b) he offers a broad and open-ended set of reasons for why citizens might accept the law as giving them reasons for action. Hart writes that a citizen "may obey it [the law] for a variety of different reasons and among them may often, though not always, be the knowledge that it will be best for him to do so". 24 One alternative that comes immediately to mind is that people often obey the law for purely prudential reasons: to avoid the financial penalties, potential loss of liberty, or public humiliation that can come from being adjudicated a law-breaker. However, Hart builds his theory of law from a critique of Austin's command theory of law, and a key part of Hart's critique is that for many people law is more than (that phrase again) the "gunman situation writ large" -that a perception of (legal) obligation can frequently be something different from merely feeling obliged (coerced). 38 Hart clearly intends an understanding of legal normativity where legal reasons are something distinct from (mere) prudential reasons. 25 Hart could be read as treating law as a sui generis form of normativity, and there is support for this position in a number of his writings. 39 As mentioned, Hart, as legal positivist, does not explore whether there are good moral reasons for accepting a particular legal system (or all legal systems) as giving reasons for action. Analogously, Hart does not explore in any length what kind of reasons people might think that the law gives them. It is sufficient for Hart that some people treat the law as giving reasons for action; this is a fact for which the descriptive or conceptual theorist should attempt to account. As Hart sees it, it is not for the theorist of law to be too concerned about what sort of reasons these might be, and whether they are well grounded. Elsewhere (as part of his debate with Lon Fuller), Hart emphasizes that one should not confuse "ought" with morality -that there were many forms of "ought," many sorts of reasons for action. 40 26 Along the same lines, one could read Hart as saying that for the person who accepts the law, the sort of reason the law gives is (simply) a legal reason, just as in other contexts people might consider themselves as subject to chess reasons (while playing that gamee.g., reasons within the game for moving the bishop diagonally rather than otherwise, and to this square rather than another one), etiquette reasons, or fashion reasons. There is, to be sure, something a little strange about this line of analysis -one can understand the force of the objection that "legal reasons" should reduce either to prudential reasons, on one hand, or moral reasons, on the other. However, it is not clear that Hart, or a modern follower of his approach, needs to concede this point. Why should one assume that one has a moral obligation to do as the law says, simply because the law says so? While it may once have been the accepted view that generally just legal systems create such general moral obligations to obey their enactments, many theorists today have offered strong arguments against such a general obligation. 41 The alternative view is that law sometimes creates moral obligations, and that this is a case-by-case analysis, relative to the individual citizen, the particular legal rule, and the coordination problems or expertise claims that may be involved. 42 There are good reasons to avoid constructing one's theory At other places, Hart explains his view as simply the assertion that something can be "an authoritative legal reason" without assuming anything about the moral content of the norm in question, or the institution that promulgated it.
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28 John Finnis concurs, while making a somewhat different point. He argues that while law may claim to be reasonable (in the precise sense of "being controlled by reasons", responsive to "such criteria as coherence and validity"), it does not, and should not, claim to be morally obligatory, because it creates prescriptions over a wide range of conduct, and even a morally praiseworthy legal system will create prescriptions which the practically reasonable person would need to violate on occasions where there are stronger competing moral obligations. 46 Finnis rejects the idea that law makes moral claims, and accepts the view that law creates only indefeasible legal obligations, 47 which are then slotted into a flow of general practical reasoning -by good citizens in terms of the common good ... by careerists in the law in terms of what must be done or omitted to promote their own advancement towards wealth or office, and by disaffected or criminally opportunistic citizens in terms of what they themselves need in order to get by without undesired consequences (punishment and the like).
48
29 Similarly, for those who accept the law as giving them reasons for action, why should we assume that these reasons are moral reasons? For example, with etiquette or chess, we understand how a practice can give reasons that are not moral reasons. Perhaps law similarly gives reasons that are not moral reasons.
30 While many other theorists see little alternative to equating legal claims with either moral claims or predictions of official actions, I think the better view is that either equation is both unnecessary and unjustified. Like many academic theories, views equating legal propositions with, or reducing them to, either morality or descriptions or official action, discount the obvious in the search for the subtle and the sophisticated. Ultimately, the question is whether it is productive -or, on the contrary, absurd -to think that reasoning is often confined within a particular domain: that one can have "legal reasons" that can differ from not only "moral reasons" and "prudential reasons", but also "etiquette reasons", "fashion reasons", or "chess reasons". Tim Scanlon recently defended at length just such a view of reasons and reasons for action in his 2009 John Locke Lectures, later published as Being Realistic About Reasons. 49 As he argued, reasons tend to have force within particular normative domains, and we should not too quickly assume that reasons in one domain are reducible to, or subject to challenge by, reasons in a separate normative domain. 31 The advantage of the approach discussed in this article -that the normativity of law is a matter that individuals assume (presuppose) or not, but it carries no direct connection with moral normativity -is that it accounts for the normative nature of law, at least in a thin way, without the requirement of substantial metaphysical assumptions or controversial moral claims. This approach agrees with the new view that denies that the law always creates moral obligations -or even that is almost always does so, or does so presumptively, or does so as long as the legal system is otherwise "generally just".
Law and morality
32 This approach also (thus) goes against the increasingly common view in legal theory that it is an essential aspect of law that it claims to be authoritative, morally right, or at least "correct" in some general sense. 50 Why should one assume that law makes moral claims (let alone that law by its nature always makes such claims)? As with all claims regarding the relationship of law and morality, the difficulty is that both terms in the equation -"law" and "morality" -are hard to define, and all likely definitions will be controversial. 33 As part of Leslie Green's argument that "[n]ecessarily, law makes moral claims on its subjects" (part of his list of ways in which there are necessary connections between law and morality, contrary to some understandings of legal positivism's "separability thesis" 51 ), Green explains that law "make[s] categorical demands" upon citizens, and that these demands require citizens "to act without regard to our individual self-interest but in the interests of other individuals", and that these criteria together constitute "moral demands". 52 I do not find this definition of morality (or this characterization of law's demands) persuasive. Even putting aside, for the moment, Hart's essential point that law does not merely command, it also empowers, 53 legal rules do not make the same sort of (implied or express) claims as do moral rules: that they reflect universal and unchanging moral truths, and that they are integral aspects of the Good.
54
34 Joseph Raz offers a somewhat different explanation of why he believes that law's claim to authority is a moral claim: "it is a claim which includes the assertion of a right to grant rights and impose duties in matters affecting basic aspects of people's life and their interactions with one another". 55 I am not sure that this will go much further to persuading those not already persuaded that law's claims are moral claims. Many normative systems, including those of etiquette and even fashion, seem to involve claims of "rights to grant rights and impose duties". And while it is true that law, like morality, covers "basic aspects of people's life and their interactions with one another", this does not seem sufficient to turn claims on behalf of law into moral claims.
35 I do not mean this to be a dispute about the proper way to define morality; in any event, such disputes are unlikely to get far beyond one person's "that seems right to me" evoking "but it does not seem right to me" by another. I think it is sufficient to the perspective I am trying to elaborate that few of us confuse morality and law. We may be inclined to overestimate the moral merits of the law, but we still do not confuse the two. Who, besides a strong believer in a Sharia legal system, thinks that law is essentially an instantiation of morality, grounded in divine command or otherwise? It is true that the early Common Law judges in England (and commentators on the Common Law from that period) cited "Reason" with a capital "R" as the justification for why the Common Law rules were the way they were (the judges characterizing their actions as declaring the existing law, while modern observers would describe their decisions as making new law or modifying existing law), but even legal figures from that period did not conflate or confuse law with morality. In English (and later American) Common Law, there was no legal obligation to rescue another, however easy and low-risk the rescue might be, 56 and there was no legal obligation to keep one's promises (only those promises that were supported by "consideration" -that is, that were part of a bargain). 57 In these, and many 36 (Actually, though, one can find versions of such a view among some recent works in jurisprudence. Greenberg, in his "Moral Impact Theory of Law", offers the radical view that "the law is the moral impact of the relevant actions of legal institutions". 58 Law, under this analysis, is thus a quite specific subset of morality: the impact on our moral rights, duties, and authorizations by the actions of legal officials. In a recent work, Greenberg restated his view in the following terms: "that legal obligations are those genuine obligations that obtain in virtue of the actions of legal institutions". 59 Under this approach, one might think of law as being defined on either end of a process: "law" as being a certain set of officials authorized to take actions in the name of the state over certain sorts of disputes; and "law" as the moral rights and duties that result from those actions. Heidi Hurd, in an earlier article, offered a comparable view: that law should be seen as a theoretical authority regarding our moral obligations. 60 However, such equations of law and morality seem sufficiently distant from how most people perceive law to be non-starters as theories about the nature of law.)
37 An approach put forward by David Enoch explains a way of understanding the connection between law and morality that does not require us to think of the law as making a moral claim or as being some sort of subset of morality. Enoch's argument is that legal enactments and other actions by legal officials can act as "triggering reasons", giving us reasons to act under the moral reasons for action that we already had. 61 This parallels a more common observation that law may make more articulate or determinate our general obligations: where our obligation to drive safely now means driving on one particular side of the road and below a specified speed, and supporting the basic needs of society and helping the poor now means paying a certain percentage of one's income to a government fund as taxes.
38 What may be mysterious is why many legal positivist have taken a more ambitious starting point. For example, Jules Coleman & Brian Leiter, in their otherwise excellent overview of legal positivism, asserted that it was part of the task of a legal theorist to explain the "normativity" or "authority" of law, by which they meant "our sense that 'legal' norms provide agents with special reasons for acting, reasons they would not have if the norm were not a 'legal' one". 62 One might reasonably question whether we (whoever "we" might be in this case) do in fact believe that legal norms "provide [us] with special reasons for acting", separate from the prudential reasons associated with legal sanctions, or the general moral reasons that some legal norms might sometimes trigger. Additionally, even if a significant number of people believe that law qua law gives them reasons for action, this may be a matter calling more for a psychological or sociological explanation, 63 rather than a philosophical one. 10. There are, of course, numerous responses in the philosophical and jurisprudential literature to this potential skeptical challenge. Brief but thoughtful responses from a well-known legal theorist can be found in Finnis 2011a: 29-48, 441-442; 2011c: 201-204. 11. Kelsen refers more commonly to "the science of law" (or "legal science") -" Rechtswissenschaft " . As Paulson notes in the Supplementary Notes to his translation of one of Kelsen's works (Paulson 1992: 127-129) , the reference to "science" in Kelsen's work, and in German generally, means objective academic enquiry, without necessarily implying all the extra baggage that the term "science" carries in English (such that one might comfortably refer to literary theory in German as a "science", while it would be an unlikely, and certainly controversial, description in English). 14. Kelsen 1992: §16, at 36.
12.

15.
This last phrase is, of course, not from Kelsen, but from Hart (1958: 603) . However, Kelsen (1965 Kelsen ( : 1144 writes in similar terms:
The problem that leads to the theory of the basic norm ... is how to distinguish a legal command which is considered to be objectively valid, such as the command of a revenue officer to pay a certain sum of money, from a command which has the same subjective meaning but is not considered to be objectively valid, such as the command of a gangster. 18. When writing that one can "choose" to view the (legal) actions of officials normatively or not, it is important to note that this does not mean that this "choice" is always or necessarily a conscious choice. The reference to "choice" indicates primarily that there is an option; one could do (think) otherwise. Raz 1990: 170-177 . Gardner 2012 : 150. Cf. Raz 1999 , on whether reasons are optional.
16.
19.
20.
21.
To be clear: this is Gardner's view, and Gardner here reflects the conventional position, though, of course, radical thinkers like Friedrich Nietzsche appear to raise exactly the question Gardner's quotation implies cannot or should not be raised, whether one should follow the dictates of morality (though one can also read Nietzsche less radically, as simply arguing for a rejection of conventional morality in favor of the moral system he espouses). 
22.
25.
For one good analysis on the similarities and differences between the normative system of law and the normative game of chess, see Marmor (2007: 153-181) .
Barzun 2000: 24.
27. E.g., Paulson 1992b E.g., Paulson , 2000 E.g., Paulson , 2012 E.g., Paulson , 2013 28. This particular way of phrasing the matter (e.g., the reference to "sense data") is likely not a way most Kantians would choose, but it should suffice for the rough summary needed here. E.g., Paulson 2012 E.g., Paulson , 2013 .
29.
30.
Paulson argued, correctly in my opinion, that Kelsen's analysis was far too quick to dismiss natural law approaches and was not convincing in its effort to show that there was no possible explanations beyond the limited number of alternatives he considered.
31.
A comparable point could be made, as earlier mentioned, for a moral or theological normative system, or any other kind of normative system.
Paulson 2012.
33.
In private e-mail communication, Paulson reasserted his objection to this reading of Kelsen -while he noted that the reading was supported by some of Kelsen's texts, he characterized the reading as "trivial" and question-begging. 
Green 2003:
16. His precise language: "But to make categorical demands that people should act in the interests of others is to make moral demands upon them." Hart 2012: 27-33; Hart 1958: 604-606. 54. According to some, there is a connection between morality and divine command (e.g., Quinn 1990), while law (at least outside Sharia systems) does not claim any direct connection with divine command. 
53.
55.
